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Abstract
There is an increasing amount of literature that
claims the brittleness of deep neural networks
in dealing with adversarial examples that are
created maliciously. It is unclear, however,
how the models will perform in realistic sce-
narios where natural rather than malicious ad-
versarial instances often exist. This work sys-
tematically explores the robustness of BERT,
the state-of-the-art Transformer-style model in
NLP, in dealing with noisy data, particularly
mistakes in typing the keyboard, that occur
inadvertently. Intensive experiments on senti-
ment analysis and question answering bench-
marks indicate that: (i) Typos in various words
of a sentence do not influence equally. The
typos in informative words make severer dam-
ages; (ii) Mistype is the most damaging factor,
compared with inserting, deleting, etc.; (iii)
Humans and machines have different focuses
on recognizing adversarial attacks.
1 Introduction
Most neural models, such as Recurrent Neural Net-
work (Bahdanau et al., 2015), Attentive Convolu-
tion (Yin and Schu¨tze, 2018), BERT (Devlin et al.,
2018), etc., are evaluated on clean datasets. When
deploying these models in real-world scenarios, the
models have to address user-generated noisy text.
One of the most common noisy text is typos be-
cause of human mistakes in typing words, such as
character substitution, additional or missing char-
acters. Even a small typo in Fig. 1 may confuse the
most advanced models like BERT (Devlin et al.,
2018), then a question arises: “how robust is BERT
with respect to keyboard typos?”
Existing approaches generate malicious adver-
sarial examples as attacks by finding the minimum
perturbation on each sample to study the robust-
ness of a model (Liang et al., 2017; Ebrahimi et al.,
2017; Gao et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018; Alzantot
Original: 98% positive
Keyboard Typo: 93% negative
before modification
after modification
Original: I am so shy.      Keyboard Typo: I am so why.
Figure 1: Adversarial typo examples for sentiment
classification. Only one character substitution will be
wrongly classified by BERT-based neural network. Red
line indicates the original informative character, and
blue line indicate the possible wrongly typing area
which is surrounding the legitimate character.
et al., 2018; Ren et al., 2019). These attacking ex-
amples are not that meaningful, therefore can be
easily recognized by humans. In order to prevent
humans from identifying the adversarial examples,
the community starts to explore more natural per-
turbations to create the attacks. Zhao et al. (2017)
generates more natural adversarial examples using
GANs. Both (Ribeiro et al., 2018) and (Sato et al.,
2018) generate samples with similar semantics. Be-
linkov and Bisk (2017) presents the first work that
studies adversarial typos on the keyboard.
The character distribution on the keyboard re-
sults in a special type of noisy examples, which are
natural and unintentional. If conventional attacking
examples represent the worse case of inputs, the
keyboard-constrained adversarial examples repre-
sent the more realistic inputs. In this work, we
systematically study the robustness of the current
state-of-the-art neural model BERT in dealing with
those inadvertently generated adversarial inputs.
Intensive experiments on sentiment analysis and
question answering benchmarks indicate that:
• BERT has unbalanced attention to the typos
in the input. Some typo words have a clear influ-
ence on the performance; some, instead, show tiny
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influence. In addition, different typo generation
approaches also show different degrees of damages.
Mistype is the severest source of typos;
• Machines and humans have different focuses
on the typos. BERT pays more attention to the
typos in informative words; in contrast, humans
can better recognize the typos in some frequent
while less informative words;
• The robustness of a system is dependent on the
learning algorithms as well as the tasks. We found
that the BERT-based question answering system
on SQUAD (Rajpurkar et al., 2016) is more brittle
than the BERT-based sentiment recognizer.
This is the first work that systematically stud-
ies the robustness of BERT, a Transformer-style
(Vaswani et al., 2017) neural model, in addressing
noises that appear naturally. Our observations hope-
fully can provide new insights to the community for
building more trustworthy machine intelligence.
2 Generation of natural adversarial
examples
Our adversarial examples are generated with the
following principle. We have a pre-trained state-of-
the-art model f : X → Y for natural language pro-
cessing tasks, whereX are the text inputs and Y are
the corresponding labels. An adversarial keyboard
typo example, denoted as xadv, is generated from
the original input x ∈ X and the original prediction
y ∈ Y based on gradient information or random
modification. For each generated example, it will
change the model prediction: f(xadv) = yadv 6= y.
To start, a sentence s is first tokenized into words
(or subwords) s = (w1, w2, . . . , wN ) (line 5 in the
Algorithm 1), where wi is the i-th item, and N is
the length after tokenization. Let L(w, y) denote
the loss with respect to w under the ground truth
label y. Then, we can compute the partial derivative
of each item wi based on the golden output y as
shown in this Equation:
Gf (wi) = 5wiL(wi, y). (1)
Based on the gradient information, we can track
back to the most informative/uninformative word x
though the component w of the word (line 8). We
are interested in generating typos regarding three
kinds of words: (1) informative words which have
the largest gradient; (2) uninformative words which
have the smallest gradient; and (3) random words.
For each word, we consider the following six
sources of typos: (1) Insertion: Insert characters or
Algorithm 1: Generating Adversarial Samples
via Keyboard Typos
Input: Original document x and its ground truth label y,
classifier f(·), budget K
Output: True or False
1 initialization xbest ← x; i← 0;
2 while i < K do
3 c← Segmentation(xbest);
4 for each component ci in c do
5 Compute gradients G of component ci
according to Eq.1 ;
6 end
7 Find the component c with largest or smallest
gradient norm;
8 word← BackTrackToWord(c);
9 typos← Keyboard Typo(word);
10 scoreh ← −1;
11 for each typo in typos do
12 Generate xtypo by replacing word as typo in
xbest;
13 y′, score← f(xbest);
14 if y 6= y′ then
15 return True
16 end
17 if score > scoreh then
18 xbest ← xtypo
19 end
20 end
21 i← i+ 1;
22 end
23 Return False
spaces into the word, such as “oh!” → “ooh!”. (2)
Deletion: Delete a random character of the word
because of fast typing, such as “school”→ “schol”.
(3) Swap: Swap random two adjacent characters
in a word. (4) Mistype: Mistyping a word though
keyboard, such as “oh” → “0h”. (5) Pronounce:
Wrongly typing due to the close pronounce of the
word, such as “egg” → “agg”. (6) Replace-W:
Replace the word by the frequent human behavioral
keyboard typo based on the statistics.1
Note that we do not sample characters from ran-
dom distribution to implement above modifications,
all operations are constrained by the character dis-
tribution on the keyboard. The whole generation al-
gorithm is demonstrated in the Algorithm 1. There
could be more than one typo in each piece of text
through keyboard in real life; this work limits the
maximal number of typos in one sentence to be K.
3 Experiments
We evaluate the start-of-the-art model BERT2 on
two NLP tasks: sentiment analysis and question an-
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:Lists_of_common_misspellings
2We use “bert-base-uncased” throughout.
K Max-grad Min-grad Random
0 92.9
1 69.0 91.7 86.1±0.8
2 62.3 90.4 80.6±0.4
3 57.5 89.0 74.8±1.1
4 54.1 88.1 67.1±0.8
5 53.6 87.2 60.8±0.5
6 53.1 85.7 56.8±0.5
7 53.0 84.9 51.6±0.5
8 53.0 84.4 47.1±0.3
9 53.0 84.1 42.2±0.9
10 53.0 83.9 39.3±1.4
Table 1: SST results on the development set. For “Ran-
dom”, we show the standard deviations over five differ-
ent random seeds.
K Max-grad Min-grad Random
1 15.9 19.8 20.0
2 15.8 28.7 33.4
3 25.1 33.4 39.9
4 20.8 38.7 44.2
5 18.8 41.3 45.6
Table 2: Human capability of recognizing word typos.
swering. On each benchmark, we report the system
performance when putting typos in the informa-
tive words (i.e., maximal gradient), uninformative
words (i.e., minimal gradient) and random words.
Subword tokenization. The built-in tokenizer in
BERT first performs simple white-space tokeniza-
tion, then applies WordPiece tokenization (Wu
et al., 2016). A word can be split into character
ngrams (e.g. adversarial→[ad, ##vers, ##aria, ##l],
robustness→[robust, ##ness]). “##” is a special
symbol to handle the subwords, and we omit it
when injecting our typos. An example typo for
“robustness” is “robustnesss”, which is split into
subwords [robust, ##ness, ##s].
3.1 Sentiment analysis
We work on the Stanford Sentiment Treebank
(SST) (Socher et al., 2013) in the binary predic-
tion setting. The standard split has 6920 training,
872 development and 1821 test sentences. Socher
et al. (2013) used the Stanford Parser (Klein and
Manning, 2003) to parse each sentence into sub-
phases. The subphases were then labeled by human
annotators in the same way as the sentences were
labeled. Labeled phrases that occur as subparts of
the training sentences are treated as independent
training instances
Results and Analysis. Table 1 lists the results
when we try K = {0, 1, · · · , 10} typos in informa-
tive words (i.e., “max-grad”), uninformative words
(i.e., “min-grad”) and random words. The first col-
umn (“max-grad”) shows that the model is highly
sensitive to the typos on words with the largest
gradient norms. Injecting only a single typo de-
grades the accuracy by 22.6%, suggesting that the
gradient norm is a strong indicator to find task-
specific informative words. Another interesting
observation is that the accuracy converges to al-
most the chance-level accuracy (i.e., around 50%).
In contrast, the second column (“min-grad”) indi-
cates that the model is not sensitive to the typos in
words with the smallest gradient norms. Even with
K = 10, the accuracy drops merely by 9%, which
indicates that in some lucky cases human keyboard
typos may not influence the final predictions.
This comparison discovers the unbalanced atten-
tion of BERT to the typos in the input. Only the
adversarial attacks based on informative parts re-
ally matter. However, after K = 7, any typos in the
words with the largest gradient norms can’t make
the model predictions worse any more, because
the current most informative words already contain
typos, and then it would not change any words in
the sentence. In this case, if an adversary wants to
attack BERT intentionally, the best strategy is adap-
tively mixing up “max-grad” and “random” policy
for adversarial sample generation.
Next, we further explore the fine-grained influ-
ence of the six kinds of word modifications (i.e.,
“insertion”, “deletion”, “swap”, “mistype”, “pro-
nounce” and “replace-w”) in Fig. 2. Insertion
modification has the minimum influence, because
sub-words tokenization of BERT would not change
much in some cases, such as “apple”→ “applee”.
Instead, mistype because of fast typing on the key-
board hurts the performance most. The main reason
is mistype can generate some uncommon samples,
such as “own”→ “0wn” or “9wn”.
Comparison between human and machine.
To investigate how well humans can read our typo-
injected text, we conducted human evaluation. As
studied in (McCusker et al., 1981; Michel et al.,
2019), some typos are not easily recognized by hu-
mans. We invited 10 persons to read and detect
typos in 100 examples used in Table 1, then we
64
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
Insert Delete Swap Mistype Wiki-Typo All
A
cc
ur
ac
y
(%
)
Figure 2: Adversarial Typos examples via different
types. Left to right: insert, delete, swap, mistype, wiki-
typo (common typos by human, including pronuncia-
tion and replace-w), all (combines all types of typos).
count the number of sentences where any typos
are detected. The detection would be easy if they
spend a long time, so we allocated only three sec-
onds for each sentence. Table 2 shows the results
with K = 1 ∼ 5, and the scores are the averaged
detected counts. Interestingly, the model is sen-
sitive to the “max-grad” setting, humans, instead,
are less sensitive—the “min-grad” word typos are
more eye-catching for humans. One presumable
reason is that the “min-grad” setting often injects
the typos into some highly frequent words, such as
“the” and “it”. People are over familiar with them
and their high frequencies in the text increase the
chance of being recognized by humans. Here is an
example:
“ut’s a charming and often affecting journey”
where “it” is modified to “ut”. This looks strange to
humans, but the model prediction does not change.
Sensitivity of word segmentation. We have ob-
served that humans and the model are sensitive to
the different typos (or words). One explanation of
the BERT’s sensitivity is that the subword segmen-
tation is sensitive to the typos. For example, our
“max-grad” method modifies the keyword “inspire”
to “inspird” in the following sentence:
“a subject like this should inspire reaction in
its audience; the pianist does not.”
As a result, “inspird” is split into [ins, ##pi,
##rd], which is completely different from the orig-
inal string. Therefore, one promising direction
is to make word segmentation more robust to
character-level modifications. To verify this as-
sumption, we trained two other RNN-based classi-
fiers with the widely-used GloVe embeddings (Pen-
nington et al., 2014) and character n-gram embed-
dings (Hashimoto et al., 2017). Table 3 shows the
K GloVe+char GloVe BERT
0 85.7 85.4 92.9
1 79.8 79.0 70.3
2 77.5 77.2 62.3
3 76.7 76.6 57.5
4 76.3 75.9 54.1
5 76.4 75.8 53.6
Table 3: Transferability of the SST results.
K Max-grad Min-grad Random
0 80.4, 88.2
1 23.6, 45.9 41.8, 67.6 35.6, 60.5
Table 4: SQuAD v1.1 results (EM, F1).
results with “max-grad” setting. Our BERT-based
typos also degrade the scores of the RNN-based
models, and we can see that the character informa-
tion makes the model more robust.
3.2 Question answering
We work on the SQuAD v1.1 benchmark (Ra-
jpurkar et al., 2016). The dataset is randomly par-
titioned into a training set (80%), a development
set (10%), and a blinded test set (10%). Evaluation
on the SQuAD dataset consists of two metrics: the
exact match score (EM) and F1 score. For this task,
we inject the typos into the questions.
Table 4 also reports the results when we cast ty-
pos in informative, uninformative or random words.
It is surprising that even a single typo is able to
decrease the QA model performance dramatically
(therefore, we did not increase the typo size K any-
more). Comparing this QA performance and that
in sentiment analysis task in Table 1, we notice that
the BERT-based QA system is much more brittle
than a BERT-based sentiment classifier. It means
that the robustness of a NLP system depends on
the learning algorithm as well as the task.
4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated how the state-of-the-art
model, BERT, is robust or brittle to keyboard typos.
Our experimental results show the different sensi-
tivities to different types of words, and suggest the
necessity of considering the robustness of the neu-
ral models. We will release our code to reproduce
our results, and in future work, we will consider
how to make subword-based models more robust
to human typos in NLP tasks.
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